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In Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,1 the Supreme Court sig-
nificantly lightened the burden on plaintiffs bringing § 19832 suits
against private party defendants under the "joint participation"
rationale of state action. The Court held that a private creditor
becomes a state actor when it files a petition with the court seeking
to attach a debtor's assets pursuant to a state statute that alleg-
edly violates due process.' The Court concluded that a plaintiff
may satisfy § 1983's state action requirement merely by showing
that the private defendant "acted together with or . . . obtained
significant aid from state officials."' That the private creditor trig-
gered the subsequent attachment of the debtor's property by pub-
lic officers was sufficient to meet this test.
In dissent, Justice Powell characterized the majority's holding
as a "disquieting example of how expansive judicial decisionmak-
ing can ensnare a person who had every reason to believe he was
acting in strict accordance with law."' The majority responded by
suggesting that private actors might be entitled to a good faith or
qualified immunity defense similar to that enjoyed by public offi-
cials, although it expressly left the question open.6
This Comment evaluates the impact of Lugar on the joint par-
ticipation doctrine in general and on the development of private
party immunities in particular. Section I focuses on the state ac-
t A.B. 1987, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
1 457 US 922 (1982).
2 Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 USC § 1983 (1982).
3 Lugar, 457 US at 941.
, Id at 937.
5 Id at 944 (Powell dissenting).
I Id at 942 n 23.
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tion doctrine and its justification as a shield to protect personal
autonomy and private choice from constitutional scrutiny. The
pre-Lugar formulation of the joint participation rationale per-
formed this function by allowing a plaintiff to sue a private indi-
vidual or entity only if the defendant intentionally conspired with
a state officer. Although a private party defendant was not truly an
officer of the state, the conspiratorial agreement-the "meeting of
the minds"-imputed the acts of the public officer to the private
individual. In Lugar, however, the Court dramatically eased
§ 1983's actionable threshold by removing the conspiratorial intent
requirement, opening a large area of previously protected conduct
to constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, under Lugar, private party de-
fendants who rely on seemingly valid state enactments or legiti-
mate state authority can presumably be held liable under § 1983,
even when the public officers who actually commit the constitu-
tional deprivation are immune from liability. Thus, the critical
shielding function must necessarily shift from the state action to
the immunity side of the equation.
Section II considers the development of the Supreme Court's
public officer immunity jurisprudence, the logical source to which
to turn when devising a private party immunity. The Court refor-
mulated its public officer immunity in Harlow v Fitzgerald, dis-
carding the subjective prong of its immunity analysis and adopting
a purely objective test that insulates public officers from liability
unless they violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable
person would know. 7 The major policy consideration underlying
the Court's immunity jurisprudence is the concern that officers will
fail to pursue their legitimate duties vigorously if they fear liability
for reasonable decisions. The objective nature of the Harlow refor-
mulation responds to this concern by enabling courts considering
immunity claims to decide the objective reasonableness of the de-
fendant official's conduct as a matter of law and to render deci-
sions on unmeritorious suits at the summary judgment stage of the
proceedings. Finally, the Section considers the ways in which lower
courts have applied the Court's public officer analysis to the pri-
vate immunity context.
Section III proposes a private party immunity that adequately
responds to Lugar's reformulation of the state action doctrine and
comports with the rationale underlying the Court's public officer
jurisprudence. Just as public officers are deterred from exercising
457 US 800, 818 (1982).
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their discretion by fear of frivolous but protracted litigation, pri-
vate parties may be deterred from relying on presumptively valid
state statutes and legitimate state authority for fear of Lugar-style
liability, thus creating an incentive for private individuals to resort
to less desirable methods of self-help. This Comment proposes
completing the state action fiction by according private individuals
the full benefits of qualified immunity. Treating private individu-
als who act jointly with public officers as officers of the state for
purposes of liability but not immunity creates a fundamental
asymmetry that flouts the notion of private autonomy. Qualifiedimmunity addresses this asymmetry by providing an objective test
that shields from liability those private individuals who had no
reason to know that their conduct violated established constitu-
tional rights.
I. THE STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
Before turning to the precise contours of the state action doc-
trine, it is helpful to examine its underlying justifications.
A. Maintaining the Public-Private Distinction
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides a cause of action against
"every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State"
deprives another of his "rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws .... ", By fashioning a federal right
enforceable in the federal courts, the Reconstruction Congress
hoped to give life to the fledgling Fourteenth Amendment and its
dual commands of equal protection and due process.' The purpose
of the statute was to deter public officials from using the badge of
their authority to violate persons' constitutional rights10 and to
8 42 USC § 1983. For the full text of the statute, see note 2.
' Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 180 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v Dept.
of Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978). Congress passed § 1983 pursuant to § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The original formulation of § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was entitled "An act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat 13
(1871). As Senator Edmunds, the floor manager of the Act, told his colleagues: "[Section 1
is] so very simple and really reenact[s] the Constitution." Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess,
569 (1871) (quoted in Lugar, 457 US at 934).
"0 The Supreme Court has construed § 1983's protection to include federal statutory
rights as well. Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4 (1980).
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provide compensation and other relief to victims of constitutional
deprivations when that deterrence failed.1
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of claims filed under the
statute name public officers and entities as defendants. In fact, the
Fourteenth Amendment expressly proscribes only state action: the
deprivation of rights must be "under color of" the law.' 2 Purely
private conduct is thus not actionable.' 3 In limiting § 1983 to dep-
rivations of constitutional rights by state actors, the Reconstruc-
tion Congress recognized that the Constitution protects private cit-
izens from conduct by the state, not conduct by other citizens, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful that conduct might be.'4
The distinction between the public arena, which is subject to
constitutional constraints, and the private arena, which is shielded
from such limitations, can be traced to the nation's founding. In-
deed, "the people of the newly formed United States were deter-
mined to place specific strictures on the national government."'" A
constitution is by its nature a two-way compact between a citi-
zenry and the state, limiting the state's right to intrude on a vast
area of private conduct.' The Lugar Court reaffirmed this ration-
ale and viewed adherence to the state action requirement as a way
of "preserv[ing] an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power.... A major conse-
quence is to require the courts to respect the limits of their own
power as directed against state governments and private inter-
ests. '7 By excluding private action from the reach of the Constitu-
tion's prohibitions, the state action requirement provides a zone of
" Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247, 253-57 (1978).
2 The Court in Lugar concluded that the "under color of" state law requirement of
§ 1983 and the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are coextensive
when the § 1983 suit alleges a violation of a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
457 US at 935 n 18. See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 2.06 at 85 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed 1986) ("Civil Rights
Litigation").
'3 See, for example, Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345, 349 (1974) (find-
ing no state action where heavily regulated utility company terminated service to
customers).
14 See, for example, the Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883); NCAA v Tarkanian, 488
US 179, 109 S Ct 454, 461 (1988). The exception is the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against slavery, which governs private as well as public conduct. Civil Rights Cases, 109 US
at 20.
"5 William M. Burke and David J. Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Cred-
itors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S Cal L Rev 1003, 1013 (1973).
"e See James M. Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and "State Action": The View
of the Framers, 22 Willamette L Rev 445, 447-48 (1986).
1 Lugar, 457 US at 936-37.
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private autonomy and free choice that is "basic under any concep-
tion of liberty.""8
The dichotomy between private and public conduct is far from
absolute, however.19 The Court has indicated that when private
conduct is closely linked to public conduct, a private individual
may act "under color of" state law even though he is not an officer
of the state.20 When both private and public entities are involved,
the court must decide when the "private conduct ought to be
treated as if it were governmental conduct." 1 When a plaintiff
challenges purely public conduct, the inquiry into the public-pri-
vate connection is unnecessary; the public officers provide the
requisite state action because they "carry a badge of authority of a
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it."'2 2 But often public
and private action are closely intermingled, presenting courts with
a difficult task of characterization.
B. The Supreme Court's State Action Jurisprudence
Purely private conduct is not subject to § 1983 unless there is
"something more" to transform it into public conduct.2 s The Court
has developed various tests to determine when this additional ele-
ment exists. The "public function" test, for example, identifies
conduct as "public" when a private party performs a function that
has been "'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.' 1,24
The "nexus" or "symbiosis" test isolates situations in which a pri-
vate actor enjoys an interdependent relationship with the state.25
IS Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-2 at 1691 (Foundation, 2d ed
1988).
19 This Comment uses "public" conduct to denote conduct by a government officer or
other government employee.
20 Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co., 398 US 144, 152 (1970).
"' Nahmod, Civil Rights Litigation § 2.04 at 78 (emphasis in original) (cited in note 12).
" Monroe, 365 US at 172.
'3 Lugar, 457 US at 939.
" Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1005 (1982) (emphasis added), citing Jackson v Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345, 353 (1974). See also Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946)
(holding that a private corporation that owned a town's roads and sidewalks could not pre-
vent an individual from using the roads and sidewalks for the distribution of religious
materials).
25 Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961) (finding state action
under the symbiosis test where municipal authority received money from a space it leased to
a restaurant that discriminated against black customers); Jackson, 419 US at 349 (finding
no state action where heavily regulated utility company terminated service to customers on
the ground that there failed to be "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged activity of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter [could] be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.").
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The "state compulsion" test attaches liability to private conduct
when a state law or custom compels the action of the private
party.2 1 And finally, the "joint participation" test identifies those
cases in which a private party conspires or acts in concert with a
state officer.
The Court has acknowledged, however, that the state action
doctrine is not tied to tests and categories. Instead, the recognition
of state action depends upon an ad hoc analysis of the facts of each
case.28 The Court seems to evaluate the facts, measure the strength
of the link between the private and public conduct, and then at-
tach a label to the result it reaches that most appropriately de-
scribes the connection. Plaintiffs often attempt to shoehorn their
case into several different theories with the hope that the Court
will adopt one of them.29 Most commentators agree that the state
action doctrine is essentially malleable and unpredictable.30 As one
observer put it, it is the "anti-doctrine."'"
The following overview of the Supreme Court's pre-Lugar
joint participation jurisprudence suggests that the Court had lim-
ited the category of actionable cases to those in which private par-
ties conspired with state officers. The discussion of Lugar's trans-
28 Adickes, 398 US at 170. Adickes articulated two distinct state action theories: the
"state compulsion" test and the "joint participation" test. The case involved a white North-
ern woman who was refused service at a Southern lunchcounter because she seated herself
with a group of black students. Under the state compulsion theory, the Court held that the
plaintiff could maintain a § 1983 action if she could show she was refused service "because
of a state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants." Id at 171. For a
discussion of Adickes in the joint participation context, see text at notes 33-37.
27 Id at 152. According to one treatise, the joint participation rationale has been the
"exception" to the trend of "cut[ting] back on findings of state action." Nahmod, Civil
Rights Litigation § 2.01 at 73-74 (cited in note 12).
28 Lugar, 457 US at 939.
29 For example, in NCAA v Tarkanian, 488 US 179 (1988), the plaintiff alleged under a
"public function" theory that the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, a public entity, had dele-
gated to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, a private organization, the authority
to govern the school's athletic programs. Id at 191-92. He also asserted under the "nexus"
theory that the NCAA's power was so great that the school had no choice but to obey its
commands. Id at 198-99. Finally, he claimed that UNLV and the NCAA were "joint partici-
pants" in the investigation of UNLV's athletic programs. Id at 196 n 16. Five members of
the Court rejected all three theories and found no state action. Id at 191-99. The four-
member dissent, however, embraced the plaintiff's "joint participation" rationale. Id at 200
(White dissenting).
30 See, for example, Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: Supreme Court
Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 Fordham L Rev 665 (1989); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. and
John E. Nowack, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 S Ct Rev 221; Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate
Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U Pa L Rev 1441, 1484 n 156 (1982).
21 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-1 at 1688-91 (cited in note 18).
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formation of the joint participation doctrine concludes that the
opinion shifted the state action shielding function to the immunity
side of the equation.
1. The Court's pre-Lugar joint participation jurisprudence.
The joint participation theory finds its roots in "traditional
principles of agency, partnership, joint venture and the like."32 The
Supreme Court first recognized the rationale in Adickes v S.H.
Kress & Co.,33 in which a white Northern woman who had seated
herself with a group of black students at a Southern lunchcounter
was arrested for vagrancy after she left the store. In her suit, she
alleged that the store manager conspired with the arresting officer
to cause the arrest. The Court held that it was necessary for the
plaintiff to show the conspirators had "a 'meeting of the minds'
and thus reached an understanding" to deprive the plaintiff of her
civil rights, though the plaintiff could make the necessary showing
through circumstantial evidence of agreement.3 "
In Adickes, the police officer's position as an agent of the state
satisfied the state action requirement. The "meeting of the minds,"
or conspiratorial element, then provided the mechanism by which
the acts of the public officer could be imputed to the private de-
fendant.3 5 Under traditional principles of conspiratorial accounta-
bility, each conspirator is jointly and severally liable for the others'
acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy.38 The private defendant
in Adickes thus acted "under color of" law when he conspired with
the officer to bring about the deprivation.3
2 Nesmith v Alford, 318 F2d 110, 126 (5th Cir 1963) (facts substantially identical to
Adickes).
33 398 US 144 (1970).
34 Id at 157-58. In an affidavit, the store manager admitted that-in accordance with a
prearranged plan-he signaled the waitress not to serve the plaintiff. It was the plaintiff's
theory that the store manager and other employees had a similar signaling arrangement
with the local police. Id at 153-58.
"5 Id at 158. See also Gomez v Florida State Employment Service, 417 F2d 569, 578
(5th Cir 1969) (conspiracy charge provides the means by which the court can hold each
defendant accountable for the acts of others); Note, Section 1983 Liability of Private Actors
who Conspire with Immune State Officials, 80 Colum L Rev 802, 806 (1980) ("Under the
rationale of Adickes, the state action attributable to a government official is imputed to a
private citizen conspiring with the official.").
SC See 16 Am Jur 2d Conspiracy § 56 at 271 (1979).
8 The Adickes court based its decision on an earlier case alleging criminal conspiracy.
See United States v Price, 383 US 787 (1966) (interpreting 18 USC § 241 to include protec-
tion of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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The Court reaffirmed the Adickes formulation of the joint par-
ticipation analysis in Dennis v Sparks.3 8 In Dennis, the plaintiffs
claimed that an injunction enjoining them from extracting oil from
their land violated due process because it had been "corruptly is-
sued" as the result of a conspiracy between a state judge and sev-
eral private individuals. The Court sustained the plaintiffs' cause
of action on the theory that the private party conspirators acted
under color of law. 9
Thus, in order to sustain a cause of action under the joint par-
ticipation theory as developed in Adickes and Dennis, the plaintiff
had to show the existence of a conspiracy in which the participants
reached an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. As the
Court noted in Adickes: "[A] private party involved in ... a con-
spiracy, even though not an official of the State, can be liable
under § 1983. ' 10 Prior to Lugar, a negligent or unintentional viola-
tion of constitutional rights was not actionable under the joint par-
ticipation rationale.41 Some degree of conspiratorial intent or bad
faith was necessary for the acts of the public officer to be imputed
to the private individual, thus transforming the private individual
into a state actor.42
38 449 US 24 (1980).
39 Id at 26, 29.
40 398 US at 152.
41 Although neither Adickes nor Dennis discussed the intent requirement of civil con-
spiracy, both cases were premised on traditional conspiracy doctrine in which unintentional
deprivations of rights are not actionable. It is hornbook law that a civil conspiracy is a
combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to
commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement
between the parties to inflict a wrong or injury upon another. See, for example, Hampton v
Hanrahan, 600 F2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir 1979); Rotermund v United States Steel Corp., 474
F2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir 1973). Indeed, civil conspiracy requires "an intentional interference
with a right without lawful justification." 16 Am Jur 2d Conspiracy § 50 at 268 (cited in
note 36).
Thus, the requirement of a conspiratorial agreement-or bad faith-is the converse of
the good faith immunity doctrine. Whereas an agreement under Adickes required defend-
ants to reach a meeting of the minds to violate the constitutional rights of another, good
faith immunity protects defendants from liability when their conduct does not violate
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know. See, for
example, Lenard v Argento, 699 F2d 874 (7th Cir 1983) (police officers could not be liable
for conspiracy under § 1983 because they arrested plaintiff in good faith on a showing of
probable cause). One leading treatise on § 1983 notes that "Lugar does not in fact involve
joint action in the usual agreement or conspiratorial sense [such as the terminology was
used in Adickes and Dennis], but rather consecutive private and public conduct . .. ."
Martin A. Schwartz and John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and
Fees § 5.13 at 110 (John Wiley & Sons, 1986).
"Although the Court in Lugar held that there was no bad faith conspiracy require-
ment, it seemed to reinstate the requirement six years later in Tarkanian. Asserting that
the NCAA and UNLV acted jointly, the four-member dissent would have held the NCAA
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2. Lugar's reformulation of the joint participation rationale.
a) The facts and holding. Edmondson Oil Co., a small
wholesale oil dealer in Southside, Virginia, had supplied more than
$40,000 in products and merchandise to Lugar, a truckstop opera-
tor. When Lugar failed to pay his bill, Edmondson sued Lugar in
state court to recover the debt.' s Fearing that Lugar might dissi-
pate his assets before the debt could be collected, Edmondson also
filed a petition with the county clerk seeking prejudgment attach-
ment of a portion of Lugar's property. Edmondson's petition relied
on a Virginia prejudgment attachment statute in use for more than
150 years. The county sheriff subsequently executed the writ of at-
tachment and seized Lugar's property."'
Lugar then brought a § 1983 suit naming Edmondson Oil as
the sole defendant, alleging that Edmondson acted "jointly" with
the sheriff and the clerk to deprive him of his property without
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The plaintiff claimed that the prejudgment attachment statute on
which Edmondson relied violated the procedural due process pro-
tections established by the Court in the garnishment and prejudg-
ment attachment context. 6 Despite the fact that Edmondson Oil
had relied on a presumptively valid state law without a hint of bad
faith, the Court held that Lugar stated a valid § 1983 claim. In
concluding that Edmondson's filing of the attachment petition
triggered a constitutionally invalid attachment proceeding, the
Court dramatically lowered the actionable threshold for § 1983
suits.
b) Lowering the actionable threshold. Adickes and Dennis
placed the actionable threshold for § 1983 joint participation suits
at conspiratorial or collusive private behavior. Using traditional
conspiracy principles of accountability, the Court separated this
bad faith conduct from other private conduct and subjected only
liable as a state actor under the joint participation test of Adickes and Dennis. 488 US at
200 (White dissenting). In rejecting this argument, the majority distinguished Adickes and
Dennis, noting that "in this case there is no suggestion of any impropriety respecting the
agreement between the NCAA and UNLV." Id at 197 n 17 (emphasis added). Yet, as dis-
cussed below, there was no hint of impropriety in the "agreement" between Edmondson Oil
and the clerk of the county court who issued the writ of attachment or the sheriff who
executed the writ.
4' Lugar, 457 US at 924, 944 n 1 (Powell dissenting).
4 Id at 924-25.
45 Id at 925.
41 Id at 927. See Sniadach v Family Finance Corp., 395 US 337 (1969); Fuentes v
Shevin, 407 US 67 (1972); Mitchell v W.T. Grant Co., 416 US 600 (1974); North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v Di-Chem, Inc., 419 US 601 (1975).
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the former to constitutional scrutiny. Private conduct falling below
that line was shielded from constitutional scrutiny, although it
might well have been subject to liability under state law.47
Lugar's complaint, however, contained no allegation that Ed-
mondson conspired or colluded with any county official. Nor was
any public official joined in the lawsuit. Nothing in the record sug-
gested that Edmondson did anything but rely on a presumptively
valid state attachment statute. To suggest that Edmondson and
the clerk reached a "meeting of the minds" on the subsequent at-
tachment seems untenable at best. Nonetheless, the Court held
that Edmondson could be held liable for the subsequent depriva-
tion performed by the public officials. With one quick stroke the
Court thus reduced the requisite degree of joint participation from
conspiracy to a simple filing of papers with the county court.
By removing the conspiracy requirement from the joint partic-
ipation doctrine, the Lugar Court placed into a single category all
private defendants who invoke unconstitutional state conduct, re-
gardless if they acted in good or bad faith. The Court set forth a
two-part test for finding state action:
First, the [unconstitutional] deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible.... Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant
aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State.48
The first prong-the "state act" component-addresses the subse-
quent state act triggered by the private actor. Presumably all un-
constitutional deprivations committed by the state would fall into
this category, including illegal injunctions (Dennis), illegal arrests
(Adickes), and enforcement of unconstitutional prejudgment at-
tachment statutes (Lugar),49 regardless of the public officer's
motivations.
47 For example, the plaintiff might have brought a common law malicious prosecution
suit against Edmondson, assuming the facts warranted it. Lugar, 457 US at 943 (Burger
dissenting).
48 Id at 937.
49 One commentator has suggested that the Court may have actually tightened the
state action requirement in Lugar because now "a plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 suit
against a private party who instigates official misbehavior.... Lugar may simply bar the
[57:13231332
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The second prong of the Lugar test established the actionable
threshold that replaces the conspiracy requirement. A private indi-
vidual now need only act together with or obtain "significant aid"
from public officials to accomplish the unconstitutional depriva-
tion. The Lugar reformulation ignores culpability, sweeping in
both the "good faith" triggers (such as the defendant in Lugar)
and the "bad faith" triggers (such as the defendants in Dennis and
Adickes) with identical allegations of joint participation. In re-
sponse to dissenter Justice Powell's concerns that the Court was
applying the same degree of culpability to fundamentally different
kinds of conduct, the majority declared that it was limiting its
holding to "the particular context of prejudgment attachment," 50
in effect suggesting that only bad faith triggers and good faith
creditor triggers will be grouped in the same category. It is unclear
victim of such misbehavior from getting to the 'deep pocket' of the private party." The
Supreme Court-1981 Term, 96 Harv L Rev 4, 244, 245-46 (1982) (emphasis added). The
commentator came to this conclusion because the first prong of the Lugar analysis requires
the defendant to have invoked a state policy or law. According to the commentator, this
requirement would prevent plaintiffs from bringing claims against a private defendant who
instigated public misuse of the statutory scheme because only the statute-and not the mis-
use of the statute-could be attributed to the state. The right to sue the misbehaving official
directly would remain, however, under the "abuse of authority doctrine" of Monroe v Pape,
365 US 167 (1961).
This reading of the Lugar opinion is dubious at best. It fails to explain cases such as
Dennis, in which a private party was held liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a judge
who misused his authority-a conspiracy that was not "state policy." The commentator's
reading of the first prong ignores the last phrase, which notes that deprivations can be
caused by a state policy or by "a person for whom the State is responsible," i.e., any state
official acting within his authority or abusing his authority. The commentator's suggestion
has also been refuted by post-Lugar cases such as Howerton v Gabica, which involved "us-
ing the police to facilitate an illegal repossession." 708 F2d 380, 384 (9th Cir 1983) (empha-
sis in original). Howerton is discussed in the immunity context in Section III. See text at
notes 96-99.
60 Lugar, 457 US at 939 n 21. Like many such "limited holding" admonitions, this par-
ticular one has been ignored by many courts and commentators. See, for example, Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 890 F2d 184,
189 (9th Cir 1989) (phone company acted under color of law when it invoked state regula-
tory procedure to disconnect sexually explicit message service as long as company "acted
jointly with, or under compulsion from, state officials under a procedural scheme created by
the state"); and Howerton, 708 F2d at 384 (state action found when landlord repeatedly
requested police assistance in effecting eviction of plaintiffs). And as one treatise has sug-
gested, "[i]t is unclear... why Lugar should not apply to the invocation of legal procedures
other than prejudgment attachment that require the participation of public officials for
their enforcement." Schwartz and Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation § 5.13 at 110 (cited in
note 41). But see Davis Oil Co. v Mills, 873 F2d 774, 780 (5th Cir 1989) (low threshold of
establishing joint participation should be "confined to the context of ex parte prejudgment
proceedings").
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why the Court singled out creditors for unfavorable treatment
under § 1983.51
The end result is that the mechanism of joint participation
has enabled plaintiffs to bring § 1983 suits against good faith trig-
gers, bad faith triggers, and all triggers in between.5 2 The only con-
duct that the Court specifically placed on the nonactionable side of
the line was private abuse of a state statutory scheme, since such
conduct "could not be ascribed to any governmental decision."53
For example, Lugar could not have sued Edmondson Oil under
§ 1983 had the state statute been constitutional-even if Edmond-
son filed its attachment petition merely to harass Lugar-because
the decision to file was a purely private one, and the subsequent
attachment by public officers was executed properly. The Court
specifically noted that private abuse of a statutory scheme does not
fall within the abuse of authority doctrine of Monroe v Pape,
which held that misbehavior by a public official was conduct under
color of law attributable to the state."4 Thus, private party defend-
ants under Lugar can be held liable if they properly invoke an un-
constitutional statute but not if they improperly invoke a consti-
tutional statute.55 Surely it is a perverse result when acting in
strict accordance with a statutory scheme is a necessary prerequi-
site-not a bar-to liability.
c) Shifting the focus to private immunities. The Lugar
majority acknowledged that the Court might be treading far into
the realm of traditionally "private" conduct, but decided
this problem should be dealt with not by changing the charac-
ter of the cause of action but by establishing an affirmative
defense. A similar concern is at least partially responsible for
the availability of a good-faith defense, or qualified immunity,
5' The Court seemed to confirm its differential treatment of creditors in Tarkanian, a
non-creditor case in which it refused to hold a private entity liable under the joint participa-
tion rationale in the absence of a bad faith or "improper" agreement. See note 42.
52 The "in between" category seems to have caused a good deal of confusion. See, for
example, Collins v Womancare, 878 F2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir 1989) (requiring a "substantial
degree of cooperative action" between private and public defendants for liability under
Lugar's joint participation rationale).
53 Lugar, 457 US at 938.
5, Id at 940, citing Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961). For a more detailed discussion of
the abuse of authority doctrine, see note 49.
" See Long v Citizen's Bank & Trust Co. of Manhattan, Kansas, 563 F Supp 1203,
1215 (D Kan 1983): "Only when the private party creditor has properly invoked the statu-
tory scheme and met its requirements may the deprivation of a property interest properly
be traced to that scheme, and only then would the injured plaintiff have standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of that scheme."
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to state officials. We need not reach the question of availabil-
ity of such a defense to private individuals at this juncture. 6
Despite words to the contrary, the Court had in fact changed
the prima facie case of § 1983, creating the "problem" to which it
referred. The Court in effect transformed a prima facie pleading
requirement of "bad faith" into an affirmative defense of "good
faith. ' 57 Lugar places both good faith and bad faith conduct on the
actionable side of the line in the first instance, and then puts the
burden on defendants to prove that their particular conduct
should fall on the nonactionable side of the line. In a post-Lugar
world without private party immunities, the good faith defendants
cannot cross into protected territory. Ironically, private party de-
fendants can be held liable while the public officer defendants who
actually committed the constitutional deprivation escape liability
by claiming official immunity.
Shifting the burden of showing intent onto the private defend-
ants is more significant than merely tinkering with pleading re-
quirements, however. It signals a major doctrinal shift in § 1983
jurisprudence: in future joint participation cases, immunity to suit,
not the state action requirement, will provide the mechanism by
which the Court can protect the zone of good faith private conduct
from constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the state action doctrine pro-
vides the critical distinction between the public sector, which is
subject to the strictures of the Constitution, and the private sector,
which is not.58 The doctrine serves as the gatekeeper between the
two; it attempts to distinguish certain private conduct that uses
government power to achieve improper goals from the remainder
of private conduct that must be shielded from government intru-
sion. By eliminating the conspiracy requirement from the joint
participation test, the Court shifted the emphasis in its state ac-
tion jurisprudence, transferring the shielding function from the
plaintiff's prima facie case to the defendant's defenses to suit.
" Lugar, 457 US at 942 n 23.
For example, such an implicit pleading requirement can be found in Dennis, where
the private defendants were alleged to have been involved in a "corrupt conspiracy involving
the bribery of [a] judge." 449 US 24, 28 (1980). The private defendants claimed that, be-
cause judges are immune from § 1983 suits, the plaintiffs could not make the requisite show-
ing of state action; the defendants had not conspired with any person against whom a valid
§ 1983 suit could be brought. In rejecting the defendants' theory of "derivative immunity,"
the Court never mentioned the possibility that the defendants might avail themselves of a
good faith or qualified immunity defense independent of the derivative immunity argument.
That omission may be attributable to the fact that the defendants' bad faith was evident
from the pleadings and circumstances of the case.
58 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw U L Rev 503, 504 (1985). See
text at notes 12-14.
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II. IMMUNITY TO SECTION 1983 SUITS
The Supreme Court has not provided an analytical framework
that directly addresses private party immunity. It has, however,
developed an extensive jurisprudence focusing on immunities for
public officers who are sued under § 198311 in their individual ca-
pacities.6 0 Lower courts have drawn from this body of authority
when faced with questions of private party immunity.
Essentially, the Court performs two distinct inquiries in every
public officer immunity case. First, it determines the degree of im-
munity-qualified or absolute-that a particular public official is
entitled to assert. Once the degree of immunity is established, the
Court examines the merits of the claim to determine whether the
defendant deserves immunity protection. This Section addresses
these two steps of the analysis as they have been developed by the
Court and then turns to the public policy considerations underly-
ing public officer immunity.
A. The Supreme Court's Immunity Jurisprudence
1. Determining the entitlement to claim absolute or qualified
immunity.
The text of § 1983 is silent on the issue of official immunities
to suit. On its face, it subjects to liability "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute" deprives another of constitutional
rights. 1 Whether Congress's failure to include immunities should
be viewed as a deliberate abrogation of such immunities or a mere
oversight by the statute's drafters is a matter of scholarly debate.2
19 The Court has held that its immunity analysis is identical for § 1983 and the federal
analog of § 1983, the so-called Bivens action (named after the case that recognized the cause
of action, Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US
388 (1971)). See Butz v Economou, 438 US 478, 504 (1978) (Bivens claim). Bivens suits
allow plaintiffs to sue federal officers for violations of constitutional rights.
"0 Public officials may be sued either in their official or individual capacities. When a
state officer is a named defendant in an official capacity suit, the plaintiff is in reality suing
the state that employs the officer. Thus, the appropriate source of immunity protection is
the Eleventh Amendment. In an individual capacity suit, the plaintiff is actually suing the
officer; public officer immunities protect the defendant from personal liability. The individ-
ual capacity suit is most relevant to this Comment. For a general discussion of the distinc-
tion between the two types of suits, see Nahmod, Civil Rights Litigation § 6.14 at 374-76
(cited in note 12).
61 For the full text of the statute, see note 2. Under § 1983, the term "person" includes
state and local officers, local governmental entities, and private individuals and entities act-
ing under color of law. It does not include states or state agencies. See Schwartz and Kirk-
lin, Section 1983 Litigation § 5.2 at 92 (cited in note 41).
62 See generally Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The
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The Court has stated, however, that the forty-second Congress in
1871 intended to incorporate into the statute the common law im-
munities existing at the time."
Until recently, the Court characterized its process of deter-
mining the degree of immunity to which a particular official is enti-
tled as a "careful inquiry into considerations of both history and
policy. 64 Using the common law as an anchor for its discussion of
public policy, the Court took pains to avoid the appearance of "ju-
dicial fiat.' 68 This dual history/public policy inquiry led the Court
to accord varying degrees of protection to different public officers,
including absolute immunity, which shields the officer from all
claims arising out of official conduct,6  and qualified immunity,
which protects officials from liability for reasonable acts.67 For ex-
ample, in Pierson v Ray, the Court held that judges may claim
absolute immunity from suit because such protection met both
prongs of the test: absolute immunity was solidly entrenched at
common law, and is necessary to shield judges from dissatisfied
parties who would "hound [them] with litigation charging malice
or corruption." s
In its most recent cases, however, the Court has disposed of
the individualized historical inquiry and has recognized an across-
the-board entitlement to qualified immunity for all government of-
ficials performing discretionary functions.6 9 In Anderson v Creigh-
ton, Justice Scalia noted that the Court in its recent decisions
"completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not
Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 Ark L Rev 741 (1987).
63 See Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 637 (1980).
" City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 US 247, 259 (1981). At least one scholar
has challenged the Court's characterization of its inquiry, asserting that its use of history in
the public immunity context is "a mask for its policymaking." See Matasar, 40 Ark L Rev at
744 (cited in note 62).
65 Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 421 (1976).
66 See, for example, Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 (1951) (legislators); Pierson
v Ray, 386 US 547, 553-54 (1967) (judges); and Imbler, 424 US at 427 (prosecutors).
47 See Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 318 (1975) (local school board members); Pier-
son, 386 US at 557 (local police officers); Procunier v Navarette, 434 US 555, 561 (1978)
(prison officials and officers); O'Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563, 576-77 (1975) (superin-
tendent of state hospital); and Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 247 (1974) (state governor
and other executive officers).
48 386 US at 554-55.
*' One commentator has criticized this recent ahistorical inquiry, contending that it
ignores the common law distinction between absolute and qualified immunity and accords
officers who deserve only qualified immunity the equivalent of absolute immunity at com-
mon law. See Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who
Should Pay?, 50 U Pitt L Rev 935, 937-38 (1989).
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at all embodied in the common law."'70 Because all public officials
performing discretionary tasks may now claim qualified immunity
from suit, the historical inquiry is limited to cases in which an offi-
cial's immunity can be "bumped up" to absolute immunity.
If a particular official is entitled to claim absolute immunity,
the judicial inquiry ends regardless of the strength of the plaintiff's
claim. If the official is accorded qualified immunity, however, the
inquiry shifts to the merits of the immunity claim.
2. Determining the merits of the claim.
Although the courts often use the terms "good faith defense"
and "qualified immunity" interchangeably, there are significant
distinctions between the two. Contemporary immunities are rooted
in the common law precept that "the King can do no wrong. '7 1 An
immunity is more than a mere defense; it is an entitlement not to
stand suit or face the burdens of litigation at all. With this in
mind, the Court in recent years has substantially changed the na-
ture of its inquiry into the merits of immunity claims.
Until its 1982 decision in Harlow v Fitzgerald," the Court
conducted both a subjective and an objective inquiry into the
motivations of the defendant official, first determining whether the
defendant acted in subjective good faith, and then evaluating
whether that good faith belief was objectively reasonable.74 Be-
cause of the fact-based nature of the inquiry, a determination on
the merits could be made only after trial, or on summary judgment
in the unlikely event the defendant could show that there was no
material dispute as to the facts of the case."
In Harlow, the Court discarded the subjective good faith ele-
ment of its qualified immunity analysis, holding that "governmen-
tal officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ' '71 Clarify-
70 483 US 635, 645 (1987) (Bivens claim).
71 W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 131 at 1033 (West,
5th ed 1984).
7'2 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 813-19 (1982) (Bivens claim).
73 Id.
U See, for example, Wood, 420 US at 321.
71 See Harlow, 457 US at 815-17.
78 Id at 818. For an extensive discussion of the development of the "clearly established
law" requirement, see Schwartz and Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation § 7.13 at 168-69 and
1990 Supp at 167-71 (cited in note 41).
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ing the nature of the objective inquiry, the Court in a later deci-
sion noted that an immunity should be denied only when a right is
"sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.... [I]n the light of preexisting
law the unlawfulness [of the official's action] must be apparent."'7
Finally, the Harlow court added a limited exception to the
purely objective nature of the immunity inquiry. Even if a court
finds that the right was "clearly established" to the extent that a
reasonable officer should have known about it, the officer may es-
cape liability if he "claims extraordinary circumstances and can
prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant
legal standard. 7 8 Despite adding the subjective element-the
"neither knew" language-the court cautioned that even under the
"extraordinary circumstances" exception, the immunity "would
turn primarily on objective factors. '7 According to the Court, the
emphasis on the objective inquiry reflected its desire to foster early
dismissal of insubstantial claims and to avoid disruption of govern-
ment business."'
3. Policies underlying public officer immunity.
Although the Court has changed the contours of its immunity
analysis to a certain degree, it has consistently based its decisions
on the same policy considerations. The first of those considerations
has already been mentioned: public officials should spend their
time doing their jobs, not defending against frivolous lawsuits.
This consideration led the Court to adopt the Harlow test, which
enables courts to dispose of the immunity issue early in the litiga-
tion process. Indeed, the objective nature of the inquiry allows
courts to limit the scope of discovery,8 ' decide as a matter of law
whether the constitutional right in question was "clearly estab-
lished,"8 2 and render a decision on the immunity question on sum-
7 Anderson, 483 US at 640.
74 Harlow, 457 US at 819.
19 Id. One treatise has suggested that an official might be able to claim entitlement to
the "extraordinary circumstances" exception if he relied on the advice of counsel or if he
was merely a subordinate employee following the orders of his superiors. See Schwartz and
Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation § 7.12 at 167-68 (cited in note 41).
10 Harlow, 457 US at 819.
"1 See Anderson, 483 US at 646 n 6. Whether a § 1983 plaintiff may conduct any dis-
covery is an open question. Some courts have refused to allow discovery prior to the resolu-
tion of the immunity issue; others have ordered at least some discovery. See Kit Kinports,
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 Ga L Rev 597,
642-61 (1989), especially 642-43 and nn 186 & 187.
12 See Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 526 (1985) (Bivens claim) (objective standard
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mary judgment." In addition, the defendant public official can ap-
peal an order denying immunity immediately, before the trial has
begun.8 4
The Court has also been concerned that frivolous lawsuits de-
ter public officers from vigorously executing their duties for fear of
incurring personal liability for every decision they make.85 As the
court noted in Harlow, "there is the danger that fear of being sued
will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.' "86 Without the protection of immunity, officials might
shrink from important decisions and rely on formalism instead of
informed judgment.8 7 Indeed, when an official's duties require ac-
tion where clearly established rights are not implicated, the Court
has noted that the public interest would be "better served by ac-
tion taken 'with independence and without fear of conse-
quences.'"88 And the Court has suggested that not only win the
threat of liability deter public officers from exercising their discre-
tion with the appropriate degree of vigor, it will discourage citizens
from accepting public office in the first place.8 9
Of course, these considerations supporting immunity must be
balanced with the need to deter constitutional deprivations and to
compensate victims when that deterrence fails. Indeed, "an action
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees." 90 Some have suggested that the Court
has eviscerated constitutional rights by giving officials too much
protection.9 Regardless of the precise balance between liability
facilitates summary judgment because the court need only determine what a reasonable per-
son would have done in the defendant's position, rather than what the defendant actually
thought at the time of the incident).
8 Harlow, 457 US at 815-17.
84 Mitchell, 472 US at 524-30. Without the interlocutory appeal, the defendant's right
not to stand suit would be effectively lost because the immunity determination would come
after trial. For a discussion of the interlocutory appeal issue, see Note, Qualified Immunity
and Interlocutory Appeal: Is the Protection Lost When Legal and Equitable Claims are
Joined?, 87 Colum L Rev 161 (1987).
80 See, for example, Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 241-42 (1974); Harlow, 457 US at
807, 813-14; Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 319-20 (1975).
88 457 US at 814, quoting Gregoire v Biddle, 177 F2d 579, 581 (2d Cir 1949).
87 See Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Stan-
dard for Qualified Immunity under Section 1983, 132 U Pa L Rev 901, 913-14 (1984).
88 Harlow, 457 US at 819, citing Pierson, 386 US at 554.
88 Harlow, 457 US at 814.
90 Id.
91 See, for example, Oren, 50 U Pitt L Rev 935 (cited in note 69); David Rudovsky, The
Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction
of Constitutional Rights, 138 U Pa L Rev 23 (1989).
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and immunity, however, these policy concerns have informed and
will continue to inform the Court's immunity jurisprudence.
B. Immunity for Private Defendants in the Lower Courts
Faced with a multitude of post-Lugar suits, lower courts have
fashioned a range of private party defenses to § 1983 claims. The
different formulations depend on a court's willingness to import
the Supreme Court's public official analysis into the private con-
text. Essentially, three approaches have emerged from the case
law: no immunity, a good faith defense, and qualified immunity.
1. No immunity.
A few appellate courts have maintained a steady bar against
granting any immunities or defenses to § 1983 private defendants.
These courts have often expressed the concern that the policy un-
derlying public officer immunity-a need to encourage public of-
ficers to perform their duties to the fullest extent without undue
fear of liability-does not apply in the private immunity context.
For example, in Downs v Sawtelle,e2 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant, a private individual acting as the plaintiff's guard-
ian, conspired with a local hospital, doctor, and state social work-
ers to have her sterilized. The court refused to extend immunity to
the plaintiff's guardian, warning that private party immunity
would "eviscerate the fragile protection of individual liberties af-
forded by [§ 1983]."s According to the court, "[p]rivate parties
simply are not confronted with the pressures of office, the often
split-second decisionmaking or the constant threat of liability fac-
ing police officers, governors and other public officials."9 Although
other policy considerations might support some form of immunity
for private citizens, the court noted that "[w]hatever factors of pol-
icy and fairness militate in favor of extending some immunity to
private parties acting in concert with state officials were resolved
2 574 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1978). Downs was a pre-Lugar case, but the First Circuit does not
appear willing to reconsider its holding in light of Lugar. See Lovel v One Bancorp, 878
F2d 10, 12 (1st Cir 1989) (holding that a private citizen is not entitled to interlocutory
appeal of the denial of qualified immunity because the policy considerations that entitle
public officials to this protection are not present for private individuals). The Lovell court
did not reach the question whether a private defendant should be entitled to claim immu-
nity protection in the first instance. Id at 13 n 5.
93 Downs, 574 F2d at 15.
Id.
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by Congress in favor of those who claim a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights."' 5
The Ninth Circuit has also refused to recognize any immuni-
ties or defenses to § 1983 suits for private defendants. In Howerton
v Gabica, the court did not extend immunity to defendant land-
lords who evicted the plaintiff without following proper eviction
procedures. 6 The landlords had enlisted the aid of a police officer
to serve the eviction notice and later to disconnect the utilities.9 7
In a footnote of its own, the court construed Lugar's footnote re-
garding the possibility of private immunity as a mere suggestion
and concluded that "there is no good faith immunity under section
1983 for private parties who act under color of state law to deprive
an individual of his or her constitutional rights."98 But the court
did cite Lugar as precedent for its finding that the landlords acted
under color of law by "deliberately cloak[ing] themselves with the
authority of the state in effecting repossession."99 Similarly, in F.E.
Trotter, Inc. v Watkins, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend an
immunity to a private contractor which was sued for actions it
took that were necessary to fulfill a land survey contract with the
Navy.100
2. Good faith defense.
Although most courts equate "good faith defense" with "quali-
fied immunity," the Sixth Circuit articulated a distinct good faith
defense in Duncan v Peck.101 In that case, Peck sued Duncan in an
Ohio state court to recover a $20,000 debt. Peck's attorney secured
a prejudgment attachment order against shares of stock located in
Ohio that were owned by Duncan, who was not a resident of Ohio.
The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently declared the prejudgment
91 Id at 15-16. See also Judge Johnson's dissent in a 6-1-5 Eleventh Circuit opinion
recognizing qualified immunity for private defendants. Judge Johnson argued that immuni-
ties should not be accorded out of a concern for protecting the person, but rather the office.
Because private individuals or entities hold no office, they should not receive the protection
of immunities. Jones v Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F2d 1321, 1343 (11th Cir 1988) (en banc)
(Johnson dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 109 S Ct 1105 (1989).
- 708 F2d 380 "(9th Cir 1983).
97 Id at 381.
1 Id at 385 n 10, referring to Lugar, 457 US at 941 n 23.
99 Id at 384-85.
100 869 F2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir 1989) (Bivens claim). Compare DeVargas v Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 F2d 714, 720-22 (10th Cir 1988) (Bivens and § 1983
claims) (qualified immunity granted to private government contractors).
0 1 844 F2d 1261 (6th Cir 1988).
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process unconstitutional, and Duncan brought a § 1983 suit against
Peck on a Lugar theory.102
Employing the Supreme Court's historical inquiry, the court
suggested that private parties were not entitled to immunity at
common law.1"' The court did note, however, that at common law a
private creditor could claim an affirmative defense based on proba-
ble cause when faced with a debtor's wrongful attachment or mali-
cious prosecution suit. But it refused to transform this traditional
defense into an immunity.104 Discussing Lugar's reference to pri-
vate immunity, the court suggested that although "footnote [23]
may appear on the surface to invite the extension of good faith
immunity to private individuals.., a close examination of the Su-
preme Court's language offers the possibility of some sort of de-
fense from liability to private individuals, and does not necessarily
suggest the specific defense of immunity."10 5 Since the common
law torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful attachment both
employed a subjective standard of probable cause, which required
an inquiry into the mental state of the defendant, the Duncan
court adopted a subjective focus for the good faith defense. 106
3. Qualified immunity.
The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
recognized qualified immunity for private defendants and formu-
lated similar approaches to the question by borrowing reasoning
from one another.1 07 These courts cite the same historical evidence
as Duncan, but they justify the additional step of transforming the
good faith defense into an immunity on grounds of public policy.
For example, in Folsom Investment Co., Inc. v Moore, a prejudg-
ment attachment case, the Fifth Circuit recognized a qualified im-
munity for private individuals and entities because "a citizen
should not be penalized for resorting to the courts to vindicate
rights he in good faith has probable cause to believe are his....
12 Id at 1262-63.
103 Id at 1264.
104 Id at 1266.
105 Id at 1265, referring to Lugar, 457 US at 941 n 23.
106 Id at 1267.
107 Shipley v First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Del., 877 F2d 57 (3d Cir 1989),
aff'g 703 F Supp 1122 (D Del 1988); DeVargas v Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.,
844 F2d 714 (10th Cir 1988) (Bivens and § 1983 claims); Jones v Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F2d
1321 (11th Cir 1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 109 S Ct 1105 (1989); Buller v
Beuchler, 706 F2d 844 (8th Cir 1983); Folsom Investment Co., Inc. v Moore, 681 F2d 1032
(5th Cir 1982).
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Congress... could not have intended to subject to liability those
who in good faith resorted to legal process."108
Most courts adopting qualified immunity for private defend-
ants simply incorporate the objective good faith standard estab-
lished by Harlow. An Eleventh Circuit plurality formulated the in-
quiry as follows: "[I]mmunity attaches unless the defendants
reasonably should have known that their actions violated clearly
established constitutional rights."109 Framing the immunity in-
quiry as an objective test allows the court to decide the question of
what a reasonable person would have done in the defendant's situ-
ation given the state of the law. This approach avoids protracted
pretrial discovery and encourages expedited motions for summary
judgment. 1 0
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR PRIVATE DEFENDANTS
UNDER SECTION 1983
This Section proposes a formulation of qualified immunity
that responds to the way in which Lugar transformed the joint
participation rationale and conforms to the policy considerations
underlying the Court's public officer immunity jurisprudence.
108 681 F2d at 1038.
109 Jones, 851 F2d at 1324.
11 The line between good faith defense and qualified immunity has sometimes been
murky, however. Some courts have announced that they are adopting qualified immunity
for private individuals and entities, but then articulate a standard that includes a subjective
component, a characteristic of a Duncan-style good faith defense. See, for example, Buller,
706 F2d at 851 ("There is a strong public interest in permitting private individuals to rely
on presumptively valid state laws and in shielding those citizens from monetary damages
where they resort to a legal process which they neither know, nor reasonably should know,
is invalid.") (emphasis added). The confusion probably stems from Justice Brennan's con-
currence in Harlow in which he took the majority's language from its "extraordinary circum-
stances" exception and identified it as the holding. See text at notes 78-79. Brennan stated
that he "agree[d] with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing
liability when a public official defendant 'knew or should have known' of the constitution-
ally violative effect of his actions." 457 US at 820-21 (Brennan concurring). The Court has
since reaffirmed its purely objective inquiry. See Anderson, 483 US at 639-40.
Justice Brennan's importation of a subjective component into the Harlow test was
designed to address the following question: May an officer who actually knows (possesses
subjective knowledge) of the existence of a constitutional right in question escape liability
because a reasonable officer would not have known of it? Justice Brennan answered "no" to
this hypothetical in his Harlow concurrence. 457 US at 821 (Brennan concurring). For a
discussion of the issue, see Kinports, 23 Ga L Rev at 607-18 (cited in note 81).
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A. A Qualified Immunity Formulation for Private Defendants
1. Standard governing the merits of the claim.
A qualified immunity for private parties would adopt the
Harlow objective test and translate it into the private immunity
context. Private party defendants would be shielded from liability
when they rely on state enactments and authority that reasonable
persons would believe are valid. The exact degree of knowledge of
the law that a private person or entity would be presumed to pos-
sess cannot be determined; that is a decision for the courts to make
on a case-by-case basis according to the particular situation. In
general, however, a business that consults regularly with an attor-
ney would be held to a higher standard than one in which such
consultation would be a novelty.""' Similarly, an officer of the state
would be held to a higher standard of legal knowledge than a
layperson, although both would be entitled to rely on state enact-
ments not yet challenged in the courts." 2 The objective nature of
the inquiry would also enable private defendants to enjoy the same
procedural benefits as public officers, including limited discovery,
expedited summary judgment, and immediate appeal." 3 Whether
public and private immunities will develop precisely the same con-
tours, however, is a question left for subsequent case law
development." 4
2. Entitlement to assert the claim.
All private defendants sued under a Lugar theory would be
entitled to assert the claim to qualified immunity. This would par-
allel the Court's granting of an across-the-board qualified immu-
'" See, for example, Watertown Equipment Co. v Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F2d
1487, 1496 (8th Cir 1987) (holding a private bank to a relatively high standard of legal
knowledge).
"' See Carman v City of Eden Prairie, 622 F Supp 963, 967 (D Minn 1985) (noting
that because no one had ever challenged the state procedure before, the private entity "had
little reason, therefore, to suspect that acting pursuant to the statute would violate plain-
tiff's rights").
IS Two courts addressing the issue of interlocutory appeal have reached divergent re-
sults. Compare DeVargas, 844 F2d at 717 (private company that provided security inspec-
tors to certain government entities was entitled to an immediate review of the district
court's denial of immunity), with Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v Ulery, 787 F2d
1239, 1241 n 1 (8th Cir 1986) (interlocutory appeal appropriate only in cases in which the
plaintiff joins both private and public parties as defendants), and Lovell v One Bancorp, 878
F2d 10, 12 (1st Cir 1989) (private defendants not entitled to interlocutory appeal).
114 See Folsom, 681 F2d at 1037 ("Whether the precise contours of the [qualified immu-
nity] rule will develop identically, we leave to future cases.").
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nity to all public officers sued in their individual capacities and its
simultaneous rejection of the historical prong of the immunity in-
quiry. As discussed above, the lower courts have applied the dual
history/public policy inquiry in the private immunity context. But
regardless of the historical inquiry's shortcomings in the public of-
ficer context,115 the historical approach is particularly ill-equipped
to address questions of immunity in the private context.
The problem stems from the fact that the Court has used his-
tory to inform its analysis of the scope of immunity to § 1983 lia-
bility but has neglected history when considering the scope of lia-
bility itself. In other words, the Court has limited its immunity
inquiry to the common law of 1871 with one hand, while expanding
liability far beyond that envisioned by the authors of § 1983 with
the other.' This inconsistency has not posed a problem for public
officers because they enjoyed the protection of immunities at com-
mon law. But private parties are not similarly situated. They were
not entitled to immunity protection in 1871 because they had no
need of it; they were not considered state actors under § 1983 for
another century.1 7 Thus, to look back at the common law for an
answer to the question whether a private individual in a particular
situation is entitled to claim an immunity is to answer the question
before the inquiry begins.
The difficulties of the historical approach have become clear as
the post-Lugar suits in the lower courts expand beyond the credi-
tor remedy context. Not surprisingly, the first round of immunity
decisions addressed factual scenarios not unlike that in Lugar.
These courts readily used the common law to justify their deci-
sions allowing private creditors to assent an immunity claim. For
example, the court in Buller v Beuchler drew support for the im-
munity from the common law tort of malicious prosecution, which
"could be used as a remedy for attachment proceedings wrongfully
commenced when the plaintiff could prove that those proceedings
were instituted with malice and without probable cause.""' 8 But
such common law analogs are not easily expanded to other
contexts.
See text at notes 64-70.
11 See Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard,
75 Cornell L Rev 462, 465 (1990) ("Since [Monroe v Pape], lower courts have permitted use
of Section 1983 to remedy a wide variety of constitutional violations far beyond the original,
limited purposes of the [Civil Rights Act of 1871].").
1" See Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co., 398 US 144 (1970).
11s 706 F2d at 851.
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A case in point is Carman v City of Eden Prairie, in which the
plaintiff was arrested and charged with driving while intoxi-
cated.119 After his arrest, the plaintiff was taken to a private state-
licensed detoxification center pursuant to the state's "obligatory
hold" procedure, under which publicly intoxicated persons receive
emergency treatment and counseling at local hospitals. The plain-
tiff, who was released from the center the day after his arrest,
claimed the center deprived him of his liberty without due process.
In affording qualified immunity to the defendant, the court did not
make an inquiry into the common law immunities of 1871 regard-
ing the liability of hospitals when they treat patients for public
intoxication; instead, it based its decision on the "strong public in-
terest in permitting private individuals to rely on presumptively
valid state laws and in shielding those citizens from monetary
"1120damages ....
This ahistorical approach would be consistent with the Court's
reformulation of public officer immunity and would preserve the
holding of Dennis v Sparks. It would cast doubt on that case's ra-
tionale, however. When the Dennis Court faced the question of
private party immunity, it utilized the historical approach in re-
jecting the defendants' claim, noting that they had "pointed to
nothing indicating that, historically, judicial immunity insulated
from damages liability those private persons who corruptly con-
spire with the judge."1 21 Denying immunity was the "right" result
on those facts, but the method by which it was reached will not be
of much comfort to post-Lugar private defendants who deserve the
protection of an immunity defense when they act in good faith but
who are unable to find a common law analog to their immunity
claim.
B. The Case for Qualified Immunity
This qualified immunity formulation is an appropriate re-
sponse to the post-Lugar state action landscape and is consistent
with the policies underlying the Court's public officer immunity ju-
risprudence. Lugar significantly transformed the nature and func-
tion of the joint participation doctrine when it shifted the burden
of presenting the issue of intent from the prima facie claim to the
defense. To accomplish the shift, the Court jettisoned the conspir-
acy requirement, thus allowing a cause of action against defend-
... 622 F Supp 963 (D Minn 1985).
Id at 966, citing Buller, 706 F2d at 851.
11 449 US at 29.
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ants who knew they were violating the plaintiff's clearly
established rights as well as against those who did not. The Court
then suggested that qualified immunity would provide the sorting
mechanism between the two groups, placing the burden of operat-
ing the mechanism on the defendants. Thus, Lugar was written
with the qualified immunity escape hatch in mind.122
Courts that have denied private party immunity suggest that
private individuals and entities do not operate under the same
constraints as public officials. 123 Although the policy justifications
underlying official immunity do not precisely mirror those underly-
ing private immunity, they do take aim at a similar target. Just as
public officers should be able to execute their legitimate duties
without undue fear of liability, so too should average citizens and
businesses be able to rely on presumptively valid state statutes or
authority to vindicate their rights or to fulfill their obligations. For
example, in Howerton v Gabica,24 the defendant landlords had the
legal right to call the police officers to their aid in the eviction pro-
cedure-as long as they were acting in good faith. The defendants
in F.E. Trotter, Inc. v Watkins12 5 were under a legal obligation to
complete their contract with the Navy to survey the land. And the
hospital in Carman2 6 followed the obligatory hold procedure to
the letter with regard to the intoxicated plaintiff. After Lugar,
however, these rights and duties can be adequately vindicated only
through an entitlement to qualified immunity.
Indeed, attaching liability to good faith private defendants
creates an incentive for private parties to avoid § 1983 liability by
refusing to invoke any government authority at all. Courts should
encourage private parties to settle their differences through the
employment of legal mechanisms they in good faith believe are
constitutional instead of resorting to less desirable methods of self-
help. 27 Lugar itself suggested that private parties have a right "to
rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the com-
munity surrounding them. 1 28 And as one court noted, "[w]hat we
encourage we ought not seek to punish.' 129
122 This inference is even stronger given that the Court handed down Harlow on June
24 and Lugar the next day.
12 See text at notes 92-100.
124 708 F2d 380 (9th Cir 1983). For a discussion of the case, see text at notes 96-99.
121 869 F2d 1312 (9th Cir 1989). See text at note 100.
2 622 F Supp 963 (D Minn 1985). See text at notes 119-20.
See Jones, 851 F2d at 1325.
12 Lugar, 457 US at 937.
129 Jones, 851 F2d at 1325.
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An additional concern is that the state, not private parties,
should be liable for unconstitutional laws or official misbehavior.
To allow the legislature to act unconstitutionally while simultane-
ously placing the full burden of compensating the victims of the
unconstitutional acts on private defendants violates fundamental
principles of political accountability. 130 Indeed, the Lugar Court
was willing to protect the government from liability for private
conduct that it did not initiate. In addressing the justifications for
the state action doctrine, the Lugar majority noted that it "avoids
imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for
conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."' 1 That the Court
should accord private persons similar protection seems only logical.
The logic of extending this protection to private individuals
may be apparent, but courts have correctly recognized that neither
precedent nor common law history provides a basis for develop-
ment of private party immunities. One judge characterized the cre-
ation of immunities for private parties as a "striking display of ju-
dicial activism.' 13 2 This is undoubtedly true. Yet this criticism
ignores the fact that the creation of immunities is a response to the
original "activism" of extending § 1983 liability into the realm of
formerly protected private conduct. Allowing private actors to
claim an immunity defense merely completes the state action fic-
tion that treats private entities like the Edmondson Oil Company
as officers of the state. Indeed, it would be inconsistent to hold
private individuals and entities liable as state actors but deny
them the qualified immunity possessed by the state officials with
whom they dealt because they technically are not state employ-
ees. ' Treating private entities as state actors for liability and not
for immunity creates a flawed asymmetry, flouting notions of pri-
vate autonomy and choice that form the core of the state action
doctrine.
Finally, qualified immunity still allows the courts to attach lia-
bility to conspiratorial conduct; it preserves the holdings in cases
such as Dennis and Adickes. Defendants who intentionally violate
clearly established law would be entitled to claim an immunity,
but their claims would not succeed on the merits. In other words,
where private defendants reasonably should have known that their
reliance on state statutes or authority would violate clearly estab-
1" Folsom, 681 F2d at 1037.
Lugar, 457 US at 936.
12 Jones, 851 F2d at 1341 (Vance dissenting).
133 Buller, 706 F2d at 851.
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lished law, they would fail the qualified immunity test.13 4 As the
Eleventh Circuit suggested in Jones, "[qualified immunity] pre-
serves the full deterrent force of section 1983 by excluding from
liability only those who could not reasonably have known that
their conduct violated the federal constitution. No additional de-
terrence can be achieved by punishing individuals who could not
reasonably have known that their actions were improper.' '1 35 Thus,
qualified immunity comports with the twin concerns of § 1983: de-
terrence and compensation. 3 6
CONCLUSION
In Lugar, the Court significantly reformulated the joint partic-
ipation rationale of state action, jettisoning the requirement of
conspiracy and exposing good faith defendants to suit. After
Lugar, the plaintiff need not show conspiratorial intent; instead,
the defendant must show he acted in good faith. This shift in the
burden of presenting intent marked a significant change in the na-
ture of § 1983 inquiry. Prior to Lugar, the conspiracy requirement
of the prima facie case shielded good faith defendants from liabil-
ity. After Lugar, private party immunities must perform this criti-
cal function. Thus, the focus must necessarily turn from the state
action to the immunity side of the equation.
The Supreme Court's immunity analysis for public officers is
the logical source from which to derive a private party immunity
that responds to the ways Lugar changed the state action land-
scape. In Harlow, the Court revised its immunity analysis by
adopting a purely objective test to shield from liability those de-
fendants who did not violate clearly established rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. The Court's reformulation of
the immunity analysis from an objective/subjective hybrid test to a
purely objective test was prompted by its concern that the threat
of frivolous suits would deter public officers from vigorously exe-
cuting their duties. The objective nature of the Harlow inquiry al-
lows courts to decide whether the constitutional right is "clearly
established" as a matter of law, thus facilitating expedited sum-
134 See Nahmod, Civil Rights Litigation § 2.10 at 103 (cited in note 12). For example,
the First Circuit recently implied that granting immunity to private persons, especially
those acting to maximize profit, might encourage unconstitutional deprivations of funda-
mental rights. Lovell v One Bancorp, 878 F2d 10 (1st Cir 1989). But under the qualified
immunity doctrine, these commercial actors would escape liability only if they could show
that a reasonable person would not have acted otherwise.
135 851 F2d at 1325.
136 See text at notes 10-11.
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mary judgment on the immunity issue, early disposal of frivolous
lawsuits, and immediate appeal of immunity denials. The objective
test also allows courts to limit discovery because the particular offi-
cial's intent-whether he actually knew that his conduct violated
clearly established constitutional rights-is no longer an issue in
all but the exceptional cases.
Private individuals and entities sued under Lugar should be
entitled to a qualified immunity for acts taken in good faith. Just
as a public officer must not be deterred by undue fear of frivolous
litigation, a private individual must be able to rely on presump-
tively valid state enactments and legitimate state authority. At-
taching liability to good faith conduct creates an incentive for pri-
vate individuals to resort to less desirable methods of self-help. An
entitlement to the full benefits of qualified immunity would ad-
dress this concern as well as respond to the Lugar formulation of
the joint participation rationale.

